The Activities of the Internal Troops of the NKVD of the USSR for the Protection of the Rear and the Reception of Prisoners of War of the Wehrmacht

. The activities of the internal troops of the NKVD of the USSR for the protection of the rear of the active army and the organization of camps for enemy prisoners of war in the Stalingrad area are among the most significant and still little-studied problems in the history of the Great Patriotic War. Stalingrad and its environs were not only the place of fierce resistance of enemy troops when they were surrounded but also the place of one of their most large-scale and deciding defeats. The subsequent reception and accommodation of Hitler’s prisoners of war became unprecedented in its scale and composition, which required solving new significant tasks by the internal troops of the NKVD of the USSR. The purpose of this work is to summarize the experience of the NKVD internal troops in working with prisoners of war of the Wehrmacht captured during the Battle of Stalingrad. The author analyzed the process of forming the Stalingrad prisoner-of-war camps; determined the main lines of work with prisoners of war in the conditions of the front-line area; summarized the practices of creating proper living conditions for prisoners of war, organizing their nutrition, medical support, escorting them under guard, etc. The author has shown that the Soviet military authorities, bodies of internal affairs, and commanding officers of internal troops made every effort and used every available opportunity to preserve the lives and health of enemy prisoners. Despite the fact that faults and shortcomings in organizing the reception, transportation, and accommodation of prisoners of war were quite common, as a rule, they were of a individual rather than general nature and led to the strictest responsibility. The leadership of the NKVD bodies and troops did not remain indifferent to violations of the rules for the reception and detention of prisoners of war and persistently fought to eliminate the shortcomings, applying appropriate sanctions to those responsible regardless of their titles and military ranks. The conclusions and generalizations made in this article expand the understanding of Russian history during the Great Patriotic War and of the organization and activities of the internal troops of the NKVD of the USSR in wartime conditions.


Introduction
Addressing the problem formulated above was predetermined by the extraordinary place and role of the Stalingrad prisoner-of-war camps in the activities of the internal troops of the NKVD during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45.From a theoretical point of view, the study of this problem makes it possible to comprehend the accumulated experience of working with huge masses of enemy prisoners of war in the extreme conditions of the front-line area at the beginning of the radical turning point of the war.In practical terms, it can contribute to the development and implementation of proposals and recommendations for improving the creation and activities of present-day special bodies and troops in conditions of internal and international armed conflicts.Despite its obvious importance and relevance, in my opinion, this problem has not been studied thoroughly enough so far.In particular, a number of important aspects have not yet become the subject of any special consideration.Among them are the quantitative characteristics of the contingent of prisoners of war captured during the Battle of Stalingrad; the reasons and preconditions for their high morbidity and mortality; organization and functioning of places for the reception and accommodation of prisoners of war; compliance with international law and obligations accepted by the leadership of the Soviet state in this regard.
The fates of Hitler's prisoners of war captured during the Battle of Stalingrad are described in sufficient detail in Soviet and foreign memoirs and in historical literature.The publications of W. Adam, F. Sapp, H. Schröter, H. Dibold, K. Fischer, G. Hieronymi, J. Probst, T. Puth, and others are based primarily on the memories of the participants in the events.These works contain extensive factual material about the circumstances of the captivity of privates and officers of the Paulus' army group and about their relationships with Soviet military personnel. 1Since the beginning of the 1990s, articles and monographs on the situation of Nazi prisoners of war in the Stalingrad camps, based primarily on archival materials, have appeared.These publications include the works by A. Hilger, S. Karner, E. Tsunaeva, S. Sidorov, V. Galitskii, V. Konasov, A. Kuz'minykh,M. Zagorul'ko,A. Epifanov,and others. 2 In recent years, thematic collections of documents on the history of the Stalingrad captivity have also become relatively widespread. 3A number of researchers, in particular N. Varavin, N. Krylov, A. Fedorov, et al., devoted their works to the problems of the participation of internal troops of the NKVD of the USSR in the Battle of Stalingrad. 4 However, it appears that all of these publications do not provide a sufficiently comprehensive picture of the history and situation of Wehrmacht prisoners of war in the Stalingrad region and still contain significant gaps, errors, and inaccuracies.
In the course of working on the article, the author relied on published and unpublished materials from the collections of the Russian State Military Archive The conclusions and generalizations made in this article expand the understanding of Russian history during the Great Patriotic War and of the organization and activities of the internal troops of the NKVD of the USSR in wartime conditions.

Main Body
In addition to its principal task of protecting the rear of the active Red Army, in January 1943, individual units and divisions of the NKVD troops of the USSR fought with the enemy and searched for and eliminated small enemy groups in the rear, following the instructions of the Military Councils of the fronts.
This operational and service activity of the troops of the NKVD of the USSR belonged to the category of combat activity and was most widespread in the period under study in the area of Stalingrad.In the period between January and February 1943, after the liquidation of the Paulus' army group, 38 instances of military clashes between service units and enemy servicemen were recorded in the Don Front.The enemy servicemen attempted to escape the encirclement and tried to break through to Rostov in groups or individually.As a result of such armed clashes, service squads of the 2 nd and 98 th Border Regiments of the NKVD of the USSR killed 138 enemy soldiers and officers, with another 181 Wehrmacht servicemen captured and two Soviet border guards killed. 5oviet cameraman Abram Kazakov films captive Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus with a movie camera Source: Photoblog no.1005001: Author's blog of Andrei Kirnov, https://dzen.ru/a/Y8rxTHd1NX2Gko-y Let us also mention a number of other illustrative cases.On January 30, 1943, the service unit of the 5 th outpost of the 98 th Border Regiment under the command of Sergeant D. Yakovlev noticed a group of unknown people dressed in white camouflage robes, making their way through the ravine.After the group was called out by the service unit, a woman responded that that they were locals and were just going home.As the unit approached, the group of unknown people opened fire from machine guns.As a result of the firefight, three enemy officers were killed and one was captured.The detained female guide admitted her intention to lead the group of Nazi officers from Stalingrad to Rostov.
Another service unit of the 98 th Border Regiment under the command of Corporal M. Tishkov found a dugout in the Peschanaya Gully with six German officers in it.The enemy responded to the offer to surrender with fire and fired back for an hour.Then, the Red Army soldier S. Gorin crawled to the dugout and threw a grenade at it.As a result, two enemy officers were killed and four surrendered. 6umerous attempts of the officers of the encircled German troops to use gaps in the battle formations of the Soviet troops for escape required the involvement of both the NKVD troops and the Red Army units.Order to the Troops of the 21 st Army no.03 "On Strengthening Vigilance in the Army and Military Rear," as of January 28, 1943, it was reported that in order to escape from encirclement and conduct sabotage and subversive work in the Soviet rear, the Nazis dressed themselves in camouflage suits, Red Army uniforms, and civilian clothes.To prevent such incidents, personnel were ordered to increase vigilance.
The information mentioned in Order no.03 was also confirmed by combat practice.For instance, on January 27, 1943, an army detachment detained a lieutenant colonel, a major, and a lieutenant from the encircled Nazi troops near the village of Novyi Rogachik.All of them were wearing Red Army uniforms.In the area where the 762 nd Anti-Tank Fighter Regiment was located, two Wehrmacht officers were detained wearing Red Army camouflage suits.They put up armed resistance and wounded one of the Soviet commanders. 7rman prisoners of war in Stalingrad Source: "Attempts of the Germans to Break out of the Stalingrad Cauldron" [in Russian], Open History, https://dzen.ru/a/Ws0kDK0PItotriAK Taking into account such cases, the commander of the 21 st Army ordered the establishment of proper order in the protection and defense of the army and military rear.This was to be done under the personal responsibility of commanders of rear units and institutions, commanders of army and military rear services, garrison commanders, and commandants of stations and settlements.Control over the execution of this order was entrusted to the chief of staff of the army rear services department.The garrison commanders and commandants were ordered to organize patrols and identity checks and to search all ravines and dugouts in order to find enemy fugitives.The border detachments, the road commandant services, and the entire command staff were ordered to check identification documents of all persons in the area and to send suspicious ones to the nearest commandant's office for further identification. 8t should also be noted that, despite the fact that Paulus signed the act of surrender of his army, the remaining groups of the Nazis continued to resist for a long time, both in the territory of Stalingrad and in its environs.For instance, on the night of March 5, 1943, a group of German officers attacked Red Army soldiers near the Voroshilov District Committee of the VKP(b) and the checkpoint of the patrol company of the 228 th Separate Rifle Battalion (OSB) of the NKVD troops stationed in Stalingrad, as a result of which a Soviet sergeant was wounded.The reconnaissance battalion of the 64 th Army stationed in that district of Stalingrad found and destroyed eight German officers, who were in possession of pistols and a radio station. 9long with guarding rear areas of the front-line, the NKVD troops played a fundamental role in the organization and operation of enemy POW camps for prisoners captured in the territories near Stalingrad.On January 23, 1943, by personal order of L. Beria, the 21 st Rifle Brigade of the Internal Troops of the NKVD took under its protection assembly points for prisoners of war in Zaplavnoe, Pan'shino, Dubovka, Bol'shenabatovsk, and Baburkino.On January 27, its units took over assembly points in Aleksandrovka, Gorodishche, and Gumrak.The following day, the camps of StalGRES, Lesobaza, Sacco and Vanzetti, and Plant no.91 joined them.In February 1943, the  Since the assembly points for prisoners of war were not equipped, the prisoners were kept without food and in the open air in the area of Pan'shino and Gumrak for four days.In the southern part of Stalingrad, they were not even provided with water.Their provision with food was not organized at any of the assembly points either.On February 25, 1943, when conducting personal inspection, chief of staff of the 21 st Rifle Brigade of the Internal Troops of the NKVD established that the camps contained a large number of wounded and sick prisoners of war, including 900 servicemen in Gumrak, 1000 servicemen in Kamennyi Buerak, 792 servicemen in Gorodishche, and 274 servicemen in Aleksandrovka.According to the head of the Gumrak camp, there was absolutely no food for the prisoners there, which caused a significant number of starvation deaths among the prisoners. 12ccording to the head of the operational department of the NKVD Troops Directorate for the Protection of the Rear of the Active Red Army, the reason for that was the lack of organization by the deputy head of the Administration for Affairs of Prisoners Smirnov and Shustin file no request forms to the front for food and household items necessary to provide assembly points and reception centers for prisoners of war with everything they needed, but they also did not consider it necessary to appear before the command of the Don Front troops in order to organize their maintenance. 13he situation of prisoners of war was terrible at the points of their dispatch to the rear areas of the country, which also turned out to be completely unprepared for the reception and future transfer of this contingent.On February 16, 1943, deputy commander of the 35 th division, Lieutenant Colonel P. Beznos informed the head of the convoy troops of the NKVD of the USSR by telegram that due to the cold in the premises and the lack of regular food, the death rate among prisoners had increased at the reception point of the Vorob'evka station of the South-Western Railway (near the town of Kalach in Stalingrad Oblast).According to the colonel, up to 20-30% of prisoners of war died there and isolated cases of cannibalism were recorded.Meanwhile, the workers of the aforesaid reception center did not react to these phenomena.As of February 12, 1943, 5,400 prisoners were concentrated at the Vorob'evka station.Their transfer to other facilities was delayed due to the lack of rolling stock.(1939-1945), https://waralbum.ru/11419/However, to make the picture unbiased, it should also be noted that cases of killing prisoners of war by escort personnel were not uncommon.According to the headquarters of the 21 st Rifle Brigade of the Internal Troops of the NKVD of the USSR, reflected in Order no.051 as of March 6, 1943, when performing tasks of escorting prisoners of war, individual Red Army soldiers used weapons on those lagging behind and did not use all the means required to deliver them to their destination. 16he Order no.051 mentioned above strictly prohibited the use of weapons against prisoners of war lagging behind the columns.It was allowed to open lethal fire only in the event of an attack on the escort and an escape of those being escorted.To deliver prisoners of war to their destination without loss, it was prescribed to form columns of 600-800 people, and each of them was to be accompanied by a car intended for transporting weak and sick prisoners lagging behind.Meal stations were to be equipped every 30 kilometers in places where the escorted prisoners of war spent the night along their routes.It was forbidden to accept prisoners for escort without complying with these requirements. 17Despite all the measures taken, cases of arbitrary executions of prisoners of war during their escort continued to occur for quite some time.For instance, on March 10,  1943, the chief of staff of the 21 st Brigade demanded from the commander of the 230 th Separate Rifle Battalion a written explanation of the fact that when escorting prisoners of war to Plant no.64 (Beketovka), individual soldiers of his unit shot prisoners of war only because they were lagging behind the column in violation of the order. 18espite the unsatisfactory physical condition of prisoners of war, they began to work on clearing Stalingrad and its environs soon after capture in compliance with the order from the commander of the Volga Military District.Prisoners of war of certain categories were approved to be used according to their military specialties.By Order no.02 of the Administration of the Stalingrad Prisoner-of-War Camps "On the Allocation of Prisoners of War for Special work" as of February 23, 1943, the camp commanders were required to identify and select specialists from the engineering and sapper service and then transfer them to the chiefs of the Red Army engineering troops for clearing minefields and the elimination of unexploded shells and aerial bombs in Stalingrad and its environs.
For the collection and burial of the dead enemy military personnel in Stalingrad and in the surrounding areas, each of the heads of Plant no.91 Camp no.108/11 and Lesobaza Camp no.108/12 selected a thousand healthy prisoners of war, dressed for the season, who did not have any "leading professions."Those prisoners were formed into groups of 500 people and placed at the disposal of the commanders of the 62 nd , 64 th , and 66 th armies and the 7 th Rifle Corps. 19pecial measures were required to establish order and discipline and to combat violations of the law among the escort.By Order no.029, as of February 2, 1943 and repeated personal instructions to unit commanders, the commander of the 21 st Infantry Brigade demanded the most decisive measures be taken to prevent "looting" among the military personnel of the brigade's units in relation to prisoners 18 "Ukazanie nachal'nika shtaba brigady maiora Shchemeleva komandiru 230-go otdel'nogo strelkovogo batal'ona ot 10 marta 1943 g." [Instruction from Chief of Staff of the Brigade Major Shchemelev to the Commander of the 230 th Separate Rifle Battalion as of March 10, 1943].F. 38700, op. 1, d. 6, l. 276 of war.Despite those measures, such cases continued to take place.For example, on the night of February 5-6, 1943, being drunk, platoon commander, junior lieutenant D. Rekunov and military paramedic A. Golovin from the 230 th Separate Rifle Battalion arbitrarily searched captured German officers in the camp in the settlement of Sacco and Vanzetti and appropriated two pairs of socks and several handkerchiefs for personal use.Together with Rekunov and Golovin, Sergeant Major Bondarenko took part in the search and stockings and gloves.
The named servicemen were subject to disciplinary sanctions by order of the commander of the 21 st Infantry Brigade.As a result, Rekunkov and Golovin were arrested for 10 days with withholding of half their pay, and Sergeant Major Bondarenko (for appropriating the belongings of prisoners of war) and chief of the guard Sergeant Mogilev (for admitting persons who did not have the right and permission to search prisoners of war into the guardhouse) were punished by the battalion commander.The company commander was removed from office for indiscipline among personnel and connivance in the command staff appropriating the belongings of prisoners of war.The entire command staff of the brigade was warned that henceforth the perpetrators would be tried by a military tribunal for marauding and looting. 20obbery and looting were common among the prisoners of war themselves.As noted in the circular of the head of the NKVD of the USSR as of March 12, 1943, not only individual prisoners but often entire groups of them carried out raids, taking food, bread, and personal belongings from the weaker prisoners.Due to the fact that the bodies of deceased prisoners of war were not removed or guarded, cases of their robbery were recorded as well.
In order to prevent such cases, the Administration for Affairs of Prisoners of War and Internees of the NKVD of the USSR ordered to ensure strict order and discipline among prisoners in the camps by strengthening control and toughening punishment.Those who were caught in robbery, theft, and looting were to be subjected to strict disciplinary and, in necessary cases, criminal liability, leaving no violation unpunished.Through the barracks (dugout) elders, all prisoners of war were warned that the perpetrators would be severely punished for such violations.According to the circular mentioned above, a morgue was equipped with a strong lock and always kept under surveillance in the territory of each camp at a distance from other buildings.The bodies of deceased prisoners of war were required to be immediately removed to the morgue after the expiration of the deadlines established by sanitary standards.The corpses could be stored in the morgue for no more than 24 hours.After that they had to be removed and buried, which was to be done only after dark. 21hroughout the period under study, escapes were a huge problem for the POW camps in Stalingrad.Due to the extremely difficult situation of prisoners of war and their high mortality rate in the camps, instances of prisoners attacking sentries in order to escape became widespread.In an attempt to escape from the front-line reception center and transit point for prisoners of war Pan'shino, up to 200 people were killed. 22The critical situation with the detention of prisoners was aggravated by the fact that the army fronts received new tasks, which is why part of their bases and warehouses were relocated to the west from the Stalingrad region.The lack of properly completed requests for food for prisoners of war was fraught with the deterioration of already difficult conditions in the camps.
Once in Soviet POW camps, Nazi prisoners of war systematically showed a hostile attitude towards the NKVD troops guarding them.For example, on February 5, 1943, during a search of prisoners of war in the Dubovka Camp, a Red Army soldier of the 227 th Separate Rifle Battalion V. Fomenko showed vigilance and discovered a pistol with a clip of cartridges belonging to one of the captured officers.On February 8 of the same year, while serving as a sentry guarding the Pan'shino Camp, another Red Army soldier, I. Pavlov, was forced to bayonet another captured officer who attacked him while trying to escape.By order of the commander of the 21 st Infantry Brigade, said regiment, which guarded the Dubovka Camp, showed carelessness and confusion when organizing the capture of prisoners of war who committed a group escape and upon receiving operational data on preparations for this escape.In this regard, the command of the 227 th Regiment ordered the commanders to organize the interaction of all types of security and head it personally, exercising the necessary control.The positive experience of working with enemy prisoners of war was to be set as an example for all personnel and soldiers and commanders who achieved the best results were to be commended.In order to improve the work on protecting and escorting prisoners of war, the commanders of battalions and companies that guarded prisoner of war camps were ordered to personally provide appropriate instructions to squads and orderlies.
According to the same order, to counter the escape of prisoners, operational groups were organized.The territory of the camps was divided among them and the division properly documented.Those on guard were ordered to remain at their posts all the time before the guards changed or to alternate with assistants if they were available.The established rules for the use of service dogs were discussed with all commanding staff.To promptly prevent all escapes, it was necessary to contact party and Soviet organizations, the militia, and regional departments of the NKVD.
Due to the location of the POW camps in the front-line zone and continuous raids of enemy aircraft, the regiment command ordered to dig trenches in the territories of the camps so as to shelter prisoners of war and to fire at enemy aircraft.Special measures were taken to save personnel, premises, and transport in case of fires.
By May 15, 1943, special assistance bases (BSs) had been organized at all camps and at special hospitals for prisoners of war.They were formed from the local population for the capture of escaped prisoners.In cases of mass escapes, external attacks, bombings, fires, etc., detailed plans for the security and defense of the camps were developed.
Despite all the measures taken, with the onset of spring, the mood of prisoners of war changed and therefore the number of escapes increased significantly.On May 15, 1943, the command of the 227 th Regiment of Convoy Troops issued Order no.018 "On Measures to Strengthen the Security of Prisoners of War and Special Contingent for the Spring-Summer Period." 27The corresponding reports noted that there were not only single escapes but also group escapes of prisoners.In Camp no.108/15 (Dubovka) at 12 a.m. on May 8, 1943, three prisoners escaped through a cut in the wire fence, unnoticed by the sentry.An analysis of the reasons for the escapes absences, leaving post, sleeping on duty, and the use of official position for personal gain.
On May 17, 1943, task forces began gathering to prevent and terminate escapes.Each unit was required to create the so-called service rooms for experienced commanders to conduct training sessions, seminars, and demonstration lessons.Only the best personnel with trained service dogs were ordered to be appointed escort personnel and guards.By June 1 of the same year, each commander and soldier was obliged to have been prepared for escort and guard duties.
To quickly and timely terminate the escape of prisoners of war, assistance bases were organized within a radius of up to 20 km from the camps.Each of the unit commanders had to thoroughly study the area and the terrain around the guarded facilities and to prepare in advance possible action plans for guards and operational groups in case of escape.
As of April 15, 1943, the NKVD authorities accepted 92,090 Nazi prisoners of war captured in Stalingrad and its environs.The USSR NKVD reception centers documented the arrival of 73,092 people.7,869 of them were transferred to hospitals for further treatment; 28,098 were taken to other POW camps; six prisoners managed to escape.According to the NKVD employees, 36,230 people died (after their arrival from the army and admission by the bodies of the NKVD), of whom 24,346 died at reception centers and another 11,884 died in hospitals.According to the Administration for Affairs of Prisoners of War and Internees of the NKVD of the USSR, the total number of dead prisoners of war captured during the Battle of Stalingrad, taking into account those not accepted by the NKVD camps and NGO hospitals, amounted to 55,228 people.In fact, as of April 15, 1943, only 889 prisoners remained in the Stalingrad camps of the NKVD of the USSR. 29Despite the sharp reduction in the number of prisoners of war in the Stalingrad area, increased attention was still paid to ensuring proper conditions for their detention.
As of May 13, 1943, prisoner of war camps no.60, 108, 123, 50 and 98 were operating in the territory of Stalingrad Oblast.Despite all the measures taken, their contingent remained in a "serious" condition.Morbidity and mortality rates among prisoners of war were at "unacceptably high levels."As noted by the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR S. Kruglov, the instructions of the NKVD of the USSR on the creation of proper sanitary and living conditions for prisoners of war and provision of food for them were not fulfilled.According to S. Kruglov, who attached exceptional importance to the issues of reducing morbidity and completely stopping mortality among prisoners of war, weakening attention to the camps was fraught with aggravation of the already difficult situation of prisoners of war.According to the instructions of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L. Beria, the heads of the Stalingrad POW camps were ordered to personally take all possible measures every day to improve the situation of the contingent.All needs of the camps for food and clothing were to be satisfied in full and under strict control.To do this, it was necessary to use the economic resources of the camps, colonies, construction sites, etc., available in the region.The head of the Stalingrad NKVD was ordered to carefully study all previously issued directives of the NKVD of the USSR on improving the situation of prisoners of war and immediately take appropriate measures for their full implementation.A five-day period was established for reporting by telegraph on the measures taken and the condition of the Stalingrad POV camps.The information came directly to Beria. 30n May 1943, the NKVD Directorate no.108 for Stalingrad Camps was liquidated.By mid-summer of the same year, the empty camps and special hospitals for prisoners of war had also ceased to exist.

Conclusion
The organization of the reception, maintenance, treatment, and further evacuation of prisoners of war in the Stalingrad area took place under the conditions of time pressure, an extremely difficult situation of the front-line area, and the lack of necessary experience, specialists, and funds.These circumstances were significantly aggravated by harsh climatic factors and the unfavorable season of the year.
Systematic hostile manifestations on the part of Wehrmacht prisoners of war contributed to the difficulty of working with them and aroused the reciprocal anger of the Soviet military personnel, already embittered by the facts of violation of the laws and customs of war by the occupiers and by Hitler's aggression in general.
The physical condition of the contingent of the captured Nazis aggravated during their 76-day encirclement as a result of inadequate supplies.That was the main reason for their difficult situation, high morbidity, and mortality in captivity.
Despite the circumstances mentioned above, the Soviet military authorities, internal affairs bodies, and commanding officers of the internal troops made every effort and used every available opportunity to preserve the lives and health of enemy prisoners.Despite being quite common, faults and shortcomings in organizing the reception, transportation, and accommodation of prisoners of war, were, as a rule, of a private nature and led to the strictest sanctions.The leadership of the NKVD bodies and troops did not remain indifferent to violations of the rules for the reception and detention of prisoners of war and persistently fought to eliminate the shortcomings, applying appropriate sanctions to those responsible, regardless of their titles and military ranks.
It should be recognized that the manifestations of harsh treatment of prisoners of war were not numerous and there were only a few excesses on the part of individual undisciplined soldiers and officers, who were systematically prosecuted in criminal and disciplinary proceedings.Moreover, despite the extreme conditions of the frontline area, the command of units and formations of the NKVD internal troops and the administration of prisoner of war camps persistently eliminated the causes and conditions that contributed to such manifestations, establishing the procedure for reception, maintenance, and evacuation of prisoners of war in the first place.
As a result of the NKVD's actions, despite their critical condition at the time of capture, most of the prisoners of war were taken to special hospitals and camps and, ultimately, evacuated from Stalingrad, in the ruins of which it was almost impossible to accommodate sick and weakened prisoners.Employees and military personnel of the NKVD bodies and troops took all possible measures to alleviate the fate of the enemy prisoners of war captured after the Battle of Stalingrad.